Arsenal's summer transfer activity is wholly contingent on the the drawn-out fates of Cesc Fàbregas and Samir Nasri. "Very active" may mean something different for Arsène Wenger than it does for supporters.
The greatest surprise of Arsenal’s summer transfer season is not that the club was committed to being “very active” while doing little so far to suggest this, but that many supporters believed that Arséne Wenger would follow through this time. This appeared to be a safe assumption and comfortable investment of faith. Both Wenger and chief executive Ivan Gadzidis were forced to be upfront immediately after the season concluded, in order to reassure the growing disquiet among supporters and criticism in the media.
The collapse of last season appeared to confirm for Wenger the irrefutable reality that in seasons past was malleable; inexperience, patient development, and the arguments—based on credible evidence—for being “so close” have lost their influence to account for failures and ability to sway debate. These reasons, among others, justifiably accounted for the repetition of the same mistakes—the lapses in focus, the horrifying collapses, the predictable concessions of goals off set pieces, and the listless slow starts to matches against inferior opponents. Repeating these errors is not a compulsion, but part of the deliberate process of learning, developing, gaining experience, and measuring the incremental achievement of goals. But somewhere along the way the identical failings are no longer expressions of noble pedagogy, but symptoms of a debilitating condition.
A squad overhaul was never in the cards, but bolstering the existing squad, replacing second tier players like Manuel Almunia and Nicklas Bendtner, and bringing in promising youth for the future would translate to more activity relative to past seasons.
Granted, with Cesc Fábregas and Samir Nasri in stalled positions at the top of the hierarchy, movement in the transfer market is understandably restricted. With three weeks remaining before the window closes, and Fàbregas’ and Nasri all but certain to leave for Barcelona and Manchester City respectively, accelerated movement should follow, although nothing should be taken as a promise.
One or two significant signings were likely to be made without the club declaring its intention. As a result, the uncharacteristic early and strong public commitment to the transfer market is somewhat responsible for interpretations that an overhaul of the squad was around the corner, or at least that the problem spots would be solved without delay. Supporter angst and eagerness was projected on to the club. Yet the expectations of rapid and decisive transfer movement ignore the cumbersome situations surrounding Fàbregas and Nasri, particularly with regard to Fàbregas, whose transfer has been so tiresomely drawn out.
One scenario could surmise that as early as May Arsenal accepted Fàbregas’ summer move, assuming Barcelona’s “kidnapped” son would see the padrino’s empathy concede to terms set by Arsenal. Instead, Barcelona, holding the card of Fàbregas’ desire to come home, have stuck to an offer well below Fàbregas’ market value, as if the pain and suffering of one of their own kept chained to their pale approximation can command a reparations discount. Barcelona’s position has increasingly looked like a false sentimentalism taken to great lengths to mask budgetary constraints and get Fàbregas’ on the cheap. Arsenal had already offered Fàbregas at a lower valuation, due to what they considered to be an issue of the heart. Barcelona could have shown an equal gesture in return.
The scenario could also apply to Nasri, whose inflexible wage demands date back to February and may have forced Arsenal early on to accept a similar fate, which further links the promise of a very active response to their moves away from the club.
The counter-argument takes the same assumption but leads to the opposite conclusion. If Arsenal had accepted that Fàbregas’, and to a lesser degree Nasri, were definitively on their way out, then reinforcements could have been purchased immediately, in advance of their departures, since the money to compensate the purchases would be available sooner rather than later. This would be unorthodox business practice, but Arsenal is in an unorthodox situation.
No longer speculative are the signing of Gervinho, who has looked impressive in preseason, and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, one of the highest rated young Englishman. The loss of Gael Clichy is problematic. Kieren Gibbs could be an equal replacement if he stays healthy, but it would be wise to find a backup more reliable than Armand Traore. Replacing Clichy with a left back of equal value or a reliable and experienced backup for Kieren Gibbs is unfortunately a lower priority than replacing two star midfielders, adding a central defender, and a primary striker. This would be too much for cautious Wenger; it lies well beyond the scope of change he envisions.
There is still time to be “very active”. If on September 1st, the squad stays as it is today or takes on a new look by bolstering the defense, replacing Fàbregas and Nasri, and promoting reserves there will be that repeated investment of faith in players like Abu Diaby, Theo Walcott, Alex Song, Laurent Koscielny, Aaron Ramsey, and Wojciech Szczesny to become the players they are expected to be.
8/11/11
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